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JURISDICTION IN THE NINTH 
CIRCUIT AFTER 
SCHWARZENEGGER V. FRED 
MARTIN MOTOR CO. 
A. BENJAMIN SPENCER• 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In Calder v. Jones, the Supreme Court clearly and succinctly 1 
determined that personal jurisdiction is appropriate over a defendant 
whose only contact with the forum state is its intentional actions aimed 
at and having harmful "effects" in the forum state.2 Illustrating the 
extent to which the law of personal jurisdiction had been relaxed from 
the time of Pennoyer v. Neff and International Shoe Co. v. 
Washington,4 Calder also extended the reach of state courts by 
permitting jurisdiction over out-of-state defendants on the strength of 
the plaintiffs' connections with the forum state.5 Although Calder 
provided a welcome and much needed infusion of clarity and simplicity 
* Assistant Professor of Law, University of Richmond, T.C. Williams School 
of Law; J.D., Harvard Law School, 2001. 
I. The published version of the Court's opinion occupies less than four full pages 
in West's Supreme Court Reporter. 
2. 465 U.S. 783, 788-89 (1984). 
3. 95 U.S. 714 (1878). 
4. 326 U.S. 310 (1945). 
5. Calder, 465 U.S. at 788 (stating that plaintiffs contacts "may be so manifold as 
to permit jurisdiction when it would not exist in their absence"). 
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into the law of personal jurisdiction by providing a straightforward 
standard that courts could apply to evaluate assertions of jurisdiction 
over intentional tortfeasors, 6 and by unifying the purposeful availment, 
relatedness, and reasonableness inquiries where intentional torts are at 
issue, many lower courts have been reluctant to embrace the broad 
jurisdictional ramifications of the decision and have opted instead to 
interpret the case in ways that narrow the scope of its jurisdictional 
grant. 7 The result of this reluctance has been the denial of jurisdiction 
in cases where a proper application of Calder's holding would suggest 
that jurisdiction is appropriate, 8 and the continued utilization of 
complex and unpredictable approaches to determining the propriety of 
assertions of personal jurisdiction over intentional tortfeasors. More 
importantly, lower courts' continuing reluctance to embrace fully the 
jurisdictional vision of Calder frustrates plaintiffs' ability to sue in 
their home states and impedes the effort initiated by the Calder Court 
to empower states to resolve all disputes arising from harms directed 
into their territory. 
Last June, in Schwarzenegger v. Fred Martin Motor Co., the 
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit illustrated this 
phenomenon when, faced with a claim of infringement on actor Arnold 
Schwarzenegger's right of publicity, it held that the unauthorized use 
of the movie star's image and likeness in an Ohio advertisement was an 
6. The term "tortfeasor" as used in this Article refers to perpetrators of common 
law and statutory torts, as well as to those who commit statutory violations akin to 
torts, e.g. copyright and trademark infringement. 
7. See e.g. U.S. v. Swiss American Bank, Ltd., 274 F.3d 610, 624 (1st Cir. 2001) 
(holding that "Calder's 'effects' test is relevant only to the purposeful availment 
prong" of a minimum contacts analysis and stating, "whether Calder was ever intended 
to apply to numerous other torts, such as conversion or breach of contract, is unclear"); 
Remick v. Manfredy, 238 F.3d 248, 258-59 (3d Cir. 2001) (requiring forum targeting 
beyond mere targeting of a plaintiff residing within the forum); Carefirst of Md., Inc. v. 
Carefirst Pregnancy Centers, Inc., 334 F.3d 390, 397-98 (4th Cir. 2003); Brokerwood 
Intl. (US.) v. Cuisine Crotone, Inc, 104 Fed.Appx. 376, 382 (5th Cir. 2004)" '[T]he 
effects test is not a substitute for a nonresident's minimum contacts that demonstrate 
purposeful availment of the benefits of the forum state.' " Id. ( citing A I/red v. Moore & 
Peterson, 117 F.3d 278, 286 (5th Cir. 1997); Bancroft & Masters, Inc. v. Augusta Natl. 
Inc., 223 F.3d 1082, 1087 (9th Cir. 2000). "Subsequent cases have struggled somewhat 
with Calder's import, recognizing that the case cannot stand for the broad proposition 
that a foreign act with foreseeable effects in the forum state always gives rise to 
specific jurisdiction." Id. 
8. See e.g. Swiss American Bank, 274 F.3d at 625; Remick, 238 F.3d at 259; Young 
v. New Haven Advoc., 315 F .3d 256, 262 ( 4th Cir. 2002). 
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insufficient basis for subjecting defendant Fred Martin Motor Co. to 
personal jurisdiction in California courts. 9 By so doing, the Ninth 
Circuit in Schwarzenegger refused to allow jurisdiction under a set 
facts that clearly met the standard articulated by the Supreme Court in 
Calder. This error was an outgrowth not only of the Ninth Circuit's 
use and misapplication of its own adulterated version of the Calder 
test, but also of the court's confusion-a confusion shared by many 
courts-regarding the proper scope of state court jurisdiction in the 
intentional torts context in the wake of Calder. 
Part I of this article will discuss the Calder opinion and argue that 
its jurisdictional vision was an expansive one that intended to permit 
the assertion of jurisdiction by states over all disputes arising out of 
harms directed into their territory. Part II will review Ninth Circuit 
cases interpreting and applying the Calder decision, revealing a string 
of decisions that eventually misconstrued the jurisdictional ideal 
suggested in Calder. Part III will discuss the Schwarzenegger decision 
and where the Schwarzenegger court's analysis went wrong, ultimately 
concluding that the court's shift of focus to the aim of Fred Martin's 
advertisement rather than of the tort allegedly contained within it 
allowed the court to find the requisite "express aiming" to be lacking. 
Part IV suggests that the Schwarzenegger decision is a manifestation of 
deeper doctrinal confusion in the Ninth Circuit, arguing that the Ninth 
Circuit's iteration of the Calder "effects" test used in Schwarzenegger 
is unfaithful to the standard established in Calder. The Article 
concludes with a proposal for a much needed revision to the Ninth 
Circuit test. 
II. CALDER V. JONES AND THE "EFFECTS" TEST 
Calder v. Jones, similar to Schwarzenegger, involved a 
professional entertainer who brought suit against out-of-state 
defendants in California Superior Court in response to the defendants' 
publishing activity in Florida. 10 Specifically, the plaintiff, 11 Shirley 
Jones, brought suit against three Florida residents: The National 
Enquirer, its president and editor, and a reporter, claiming libel, 
invasion of privacy, and intentional infliction of emotional distress for 
9. 374 F.3d 797, 807 (9th Cir. 2004). 
10. Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783, 784 (1984). 
11. Shirley Jones's husband was also a plaintiff in the suit. Id. at 785. 
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an allegedly defamatory article published in the Enquirer.12 The two 
individual defendants moved to quash service of process for lack of 
personal jurisdiction, which the superior court granted. 13 
Subsequently, the California Court of Appeal reversed the lower 
court's decision.14 Although the California Supreme Court denied 
review, the United States Supreme Court accepted the case for 
review.15 
After stating the oft-repeated standard of International Shoe Co. 
v. Washington that the Due Process Clause permits personal 
jurisdiction "over a defendant in any State with which the defendant 
has 'certain minimum contacts ... such that the maintenance of the suit 
does not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice,' 
"16 then-Justice Rehnquist, writing for a unanimous Court in Calder, 
quickly added the modified understanding of this standard as provided 
by Shaffer v. Heitner: that in judging minimum contacts "a court 
properly focuses on 'the relationship among the defendant, the forum, 
and the litigation.' "17 To this formulation the Court added­
remarkably-that a plaintiffs contacts could be so "manifold" that the 
exercise of jurisdiction would be reasonable on the basis of those 
contacts alone.18 
Having laid out these principles, the Calder Court deftly summed 
up the interconnectedness of the defendant, the forum, and the 
litigation by stating that "the [California] plaintiff is the focus of the 
activities of the defendants out of which the suit arises."19 The Court 
then proceeded to highlight the ways in which the actions of the 
defendants were connected with and targeted at the plaintiff as a 
California resident. The Calder Court indicated that the story libeled a 
California resident concerning her California activities and attacked the 
professionalism of the plaintiff whose career was centered in 
California.20 Moreover, material for the article came from California 
12. Id. 
13. Id. at 786. 
14. Id. 
15. Id. at 787-88. 
16. Id. at 788 (quoting Intl. Shoe Co. v. Wash., 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945)). 
17. Calder, 465 U.S. at 788 (quoting Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186,204 (1977)). 
18. Calder, 465 U.S. at 788 (stating that plaintiff's contacts "may be so manifold as 
to permit jurisdiction when it would not exist in their absence "). 
19. Id. at 788 (citing McGee v. Intl. Life Ins., 355 U.S. 220 (1957)). 
20. Calder, 465 U.S. at 788-89. 
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sources and the emotional and professional harm to the plaintiff was 
suffered in California, her place of residence and employment.21 On 
the basis of these facts, the Calder Court concluded, "[j]urisdiction 
over petitioners is therefore proper in California based on the 'effects' 
of their Florida conduct in Califomia."22 
Rejecting the defendants' attempt to focus on the article itself and 
its circulation as the purported basis for forum contact and thus 
jurisdiction-which would then allow the defendants to align 
themselves with the New York defendants in World-Wide Volkswagen 
Corp. v. Woodson-the Court emphasized that the proper focus is the 
"allegedly [tortious] actions" of the defendants.23 Unlike a situation 
involving "mere untargeted negligence," where an intentional tort is 
alleged the wrongful conduct has a target, and to the extent the location 
of that target is known by defendants, they can be charged with 
intentionally directing their wrongdoing to that place.24 Under such 
circumstances, the Court indicated that defendants "must 'reasonably 
anticipate being haled into court there' to answer for the truth of the 
statements made in their article. "25 
The Calder Court also made note of the Enquirer's large 
circulation in Califomia.26 However, this finding was not central to the 
Court's holding because it found jurisdiction to be appropriate over 
defendants "based on the 'effects' of their Florida conduct in 
Califomia."27 The Court reiterated this basis for its decision when it 
wrote, "petitioners are primary participants in an alleged wrongdoing 
intentionally directed at a California resident, and jurisdiction over 
them is proper on that basis."28 
Three important principles that can be distilled from Calder 
should be noted here. First, the Calder Court indicated that a plaintiffs 
contacts with a forum are not only relevant to a minimum contacts 
analysis, but they can be of sufficient quantity and quality so as to 
21. Id. 
22. Id. at 789. 
23. Id. (citing World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297-98). 
24. Calder, 465 U.S. at 789. 
25. Id. at 790 (quoting World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 297). 
26. Calder, 456 U.S. at 789. 
27. Id. (citing World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 297-98). 
28. Calder, 465 U.S. at 790 (emphasis added). 
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provide a sufficient basis for the assertion of personal jurisdiction.29 
Second, out-of-state conduct that focuses its harmful effects toward an 
individual residing in a particular state affords that state the right to 
assert jurisdiction over the out-of-state wrongdoer.30 Third, 
perpetrators of intentional torts can " 'anticipate being haled into court' 
"31 in the place where the targets of their wrongful actions reside. 32 
These aspects of the Calder holding were welcome developments 
in the law of personal jurisdiction for several reasons. First, by 
identifying the area of intentional torts as one where defendants should 
have clear notice that they will be answerable where their conduct 
knowingly causes harm, the Court put plaintiffs in such cases in a 
better position to bring suit against such tortfeasors in the plaintiffs' 
home states. 33 Second, by clearly stating that participants in 
wrongdoin§ directed at a state resident will be subject to jurisdiction in 
that state,3 the Court furthered its long-held policy goal of giving the 
legal system "a degree of predictability . . . that allows potential 
defendants to structure their primary conduct with some minimum 
assurance as to where that conduct will and will not render them liable 
to suit."35 Third, the Court's holding restored a degree of sovereignty 
to states, which had started to erode in the wake of Hanson v. 
Denckla's �ullback from the expansive view of jurisdiction articulated 
in McGee. 6 That is, states were now clearly empowered-as they 
should be-to protect the interests of their citizens who are harmed in 
their state by the intentional, wrongful conduct of outsiders. 37 
Although Calder contained some clear statements permitting 
jurisdiction in states where intentional torts have effects, the circuit 
29. Id. at 788 (stating that plaintiffs contacts "may be so manifold as to permit 
jurisdiction when it would not exist in their absence "). 
30. Id. at 89. "Jurisdiction over petitioners is therefore proper in California based 
on the 'effects' of their Florida conduct in California." Id. 
31. Id. at 790 (quoting World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 297). 
32. Calder, 465 U.S. at 790. "[P]etitioners are primary participants in an alleged 
wrongdoing intentionally directed at a California resident, and jurisdiction over them is 
proper on that basis." Id. 
33. See id. at 790. "An individual injured in California need not go to Florida to 
seek redress from persons who, though remaining in Florida, knowingly cause the 
injury in California." Id. 
34. See id. 
35. World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 297. 
36. 357 U.S.235,252-53 (1958). 
37. Calder, 465 U.S. at 790. 
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courts were not too enthusiastic about embracing this view of the case. 
The next part of this article reviews how Calder was interpreted and 
applied by the Ninth Circuit prior to Schwarzenegger. 
III. NINTH CIRCUIT APPLICATION OF THE CALDER "EFFECTS" TEST 
In the Ninth Circuit, under Data Disc, Inc. v. Systems Tech. 
Assoc. , Inc., a plaintiff attempting to establish specific personal 
jurisdiction38 must show that three requirements are satisfied: 
( 1) The nonresident defendant must do some act or consummate 
some transaction with the forum or perfonn some act by which he 
purposefully avails himself of the privilege of conducting 
activities in the forum, thereby invoking the benefits and 
protections of its laws. (2) The claim must be one which arises 
out of or results from the defendant's forum-related activities. (3) 
Exercise of jurisdiction must be reasonable.39 
One year after the United States Supreme Court issued its 
decision in Calder, the Ninth Circuit in Paccar International, Inc. v. 
Commercial Bank of Kuwait, S.A.K., interpreted Calder as standing for 
the proposition that "[a] tortious act, standing alone, can satisfy all 
three requirements under Data Disc if the act is aimed at a resident of 
the state or has effects in the state. "40 This articulation of the Calder 
holding accurately reflected the scope of the Calder Court's decision 
because it made clear that aiming tortious conduct at a state resident 
simultaneously satisfied the purposeful availment, arising-out-of, and 
the reasonableness requirements of the minimum contacts analysis.41 
As Calder made clear, the assertion of jurisdiction over intentional 
tortfeasors who target forum residents is reasonable per se, which 
means that no separate reasonableness inquiry is necessary once it is 
determined that a defendant was connected with the state by virtue of 
its alleged direction of wrongful conduct toward state residents. 42 
38. The Supreme Court distinguishes between "general jurisdiction" and "specific 
jurisdiction." See e.g. Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 
408, 414 n. 8 to 415 n. 9 (1984). 
39. 557 F.2d 1280, 1287 (9th Cir. 1977). 
40. 757 F.2d 1058, 1064 (9th Cir. 1985). 
41. 465 U.S. at 790. "[P]etitioners are primary part1c1pants in an alleged 
wrongdoing intentionally directed at a California resident, and jurisdiction over them is 
proper on that basis." Id. 
42. The Calder Court based its holding on the presence of effects intentionally 
204 WHITTIER LAW REVIEW Vol. 26 
The Ninth Circuit appeared to retreat from this interpretation of 
Calder a year later in Haisten v. Grass Valley Medical Reimbursement 
Fund, Ltd. . 43 In Haisten, the court indicated that "modification of our 
three-prong test is appropriate" in light of Calder, stating, "within the 
rubric of 'purposeful availment' the court has allowed the exercise of 
jurisdiction over a defendant whose only 'contact' with the forum state 
is the lurposeful direction' of a foreign act having effect in the forum 
state." 4 In other words, the Ninth Circuit was now confining the 
Calder "effects" test to the purposeful availment prong of its three­
pronged test rather than permitting the conditions found suitable in 
Calder alone to suffice for the assertion of personal jurisdiction as had 
been accepted in Paccar.45 Thus, the "modification" referred to by the 
court in Haisten referred to a refinement in how it would assess 
whether purposeful availment was present in the first prong, with the 
"arises-out-of' and "reasonableness" inquiries remaining separately 
considered parts of the test. 46 Indeed, it makes no sense to consider 
purposeful availment and the relatedness of the contacts to the cause of 
action separately because the weight that Calder gives to defendant's 
purposefully directed conduct derives from its status as the basis for 
suit. The reasonableness prong of the test was revised in light of 
Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz to require a presumption of 
reasonableness where purposeful direction was established, with 
defendants being permitted to rebut the presumption if possible.47 
Although Calder's holding clearly unified considerations of purposeful 
availment, relatedness, and reasonableness into a single inquiry within 
the context of intentional torts, the Ninth Circuit held on to its tripartite 
directed toward a California resident without engaging in any "reasonableness" 
inquiry. See id. Indeed, the words "reasonable" or "reasonableness" appear nowhere 
in the opinion. "Reasonably" appears where the Court states that a defendant must 
"reasonably anticipate being haled into" a forum's courts. Id. 
43. 784 F.2d 1392, 1397 (9th Cir. 1986). 
44. Id. (citing Calder, 465 U.S. at 789, as the basis for a need to revise the Ninth 
Circuit approach) (emphasis omitted). 
45. See e.g. Kellner v. Technical Assocs. , Inc., 1 988 WL 33347 at *2 (9th Cir. Apr. 
1 2, 1988). "Recently, this court has modified this three-pronged test with regard to the 
requirement of 'purposeful availment,' and 'allowed the exercise of jurisdiction over a 
defendant whose only 'contact' with the forum state is the 'purposeful direction' of a 
foreign act having effect in the forum state." (quoting Haisten, 784 F.2d at 1397). 
46. Haisten, 784 F.2d at 1 400. 
47. Id. (citing Burger King v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462 ( 1985)). 
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approach in each of its cases involving intentional torts decided after 
Haisten.48 
To make matters worse, after the Supreme Court issued its 
decision in Asahi Metal Industries v. Superior Court of Solano 
County,49 the Ninth Circuit felt compelled to integrate A sahi's 
statements on purposeful availment and reasonableness into its 
evaluation of personal jurisdiction in the context of alleged intentional 
torts. This was first done in Sinatra v. National Enquirer, Inc., a case 
involving the misappropriation of Frank Sinatra's name for publicity 
purposes. 50 Rather than focusing on whether the defendant 
purposefully directed its tortious conduct at a resident of the forum 
state as suggested by Calder, the Sinatra court infused its analysis with 
the approach of Asahi, which engaged in an extensive analysis of the 
quantity and quality of defendant's contacts by assessing such factors 
as defendant's " 'advertising in the forum State, establishing channels 
of communication for providing regular advice to customers in the 
forum State, or marketing the product through a distributor who has 
agreed to act as the sales agent in the forum State.' "5 1  Applying the 
Asahi analysis to a case involving an intentional tort as the court did in 
Sinatra was inappropriate because Asahi involved the very "untargeted 
negligence" that the Calder court identified as requiring a distinct 
analysis from that engaged in where intentional torts are concerned.52 
As a result of this confused cross-pollinization of Asahi with Calder, 
the Sinatra court rested its finding of jurisdiction not on the 
defendant's intentional harming of Sinatra in California, but rather on 
"the [defendant]'s commercial activity in the forum state" and on the 
defendant's "pursuit of California clients by advertising, part of which 
involved the misappropriation of Sinatra's name in order to benefit the 
Clinic through the implied endorsement."53 Coupled with its error of 
confining the "effects" test to the purposeful availment prong of its 
three-part minimum contacts analysis, the Ninth Circuit through 
Sinatra had now crafted an approach to assessing jurisdiction in 
48. See e.g. Lake v. Lake, 817 F.2d 1416, 1421 (9th Cir. 1987); Keefner, 1988 WL 
33347 at *2. 
49. 480 U.S. 102 (1987). 
50. Sinatra v. Natl. Enquirer, 854 F.2d 1191, 1193, 1195 (9th Cir. 1983). 
51. Id. at 1197 (quoting Asahi, 480 U.S. at 112). 
52. Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783, 789 (1984); see Asahi, 480 U.S. at 105 
(involving a products liability claim). 
53. Sinatra, 854 F.2d at 1197, 1198. 
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intentional tort cases quite at odds with the approach presented by the 
Court in Calder. 
Thankfully, Asahi found no mention in the Ninth Circuit' s  next 
series of cases involving personal jurisdiction over intentional 
tortfeasors. In Brainerd v. Governors of the University of Alberta, a 
case involving alleged defamation, the court stated that the defamatory 
communications were directed at the forum (Arizona) and that the 
defendant "knew the injury and harm stemming from his 
communications would occur in Arizona, where [the plaintiff] planned 
to live and work. 54 Those contacts with the forum support personal 
jurisdiction over [defendant] in Arizona. "55 This conclusion, based 
solely on the allegation of directed harm to the plaintiff in Arizona, is 
true to the standard established by Calder. Perhaps the Ninth Circuit' s  
clearest and most accurate statement of the Calder "effects" test came 
next in Michel v. American Capital Enterprises, where the court wrote, 
"[t]he Supreme Court has held that where a defendant commits an 
intentionally tortious act knowing it will have a potentially devastating 
effect on the plaintiff in the forum state, a court may exercise personal 
jurisdiction over the defendant and not run afoul of the due process 
clause."56 However, neither the Brainerd nor the Michel court 
departed from the Ninth Circuit's orthodoxy that reasonableness 
required separate consideration in the intentional torts context. 57 
Only one year later in Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. v. Neaves 
("Met Life") the Ninth Circuit displayed a moment of clarity in its 
application of the Calder "effects" test to a case involving allegations 
of intentional torts effected by a mailing into the forum state. 58 
Although the court paid lip service to the three-part test articulated by 
the Ninth Circuit in each of its prior cases in this area, the Met Life 
court in reality engaged in a pure application of Calder, looking only 
for the " 'pu�oseful direction' of a foreign act having effect in the 
forum state." 9 Applying that standard, the court found that the 
defendant "both purposefully directed her actions into the forum state 
54. 873 F.2d 1257, 1259 (9th Cir. 1989). 
55. Id. 
56. 884 F.2d 582 (table), 1989 WL 102039 at *3 (9th Cir. 1989) (citing Calder, 465 
U.S. at 788-91). 
57. Brainerd, 873 F.2d at 1260; Michel, 884 F.2d at *2, *4. 
58. 912 F.2d 1062 (9th Cir. 1990). 
59. Id. at 1065 (quoting Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783, 789 (1984)). 
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and knew the brunt of the injury would fall on [the defendant] who 
lived and worked there. "60 The court was careful to point out that it 
was not the defendant's physical act of sending mail into the forum that 
supported the assertion of jurisdiction; rather, the court stated that "the 
relevant consideration under Calder [is] the effect of the conduct in the 
forum state."61 
By 1992, the Ninth Circuit had forgotten what it said in Met Life 
and engrafted onto the Calder "effects" test a new factor not previously 
mentioned in the Ninth Circuit or emphasized by the Court in Calder. 
In Casualty Assurance Risk Insurance Brokerage Co. v. Dillon, the 
court faced an assertion of jurisdiction in Guam over a defendant 
alleged to have defamed the Guam-based plaintiff through the 
circulation of a letter in Indiana. 62 There, for the first time, the court 
held that "the circulation of the defamatory material in the forum state 
is an important factor in the minimum contacts analysis for a 
defamation action."63 Responding to plaintiffs argument that under 
Calder, jurisdiction exists wherever the effects of libel are felt, the 
Dillon court referred to the Calder Court's mention of the large 
circulation of the allegedly libelous material in California and charged 
the defendants with knowing the situs of their intended harm "because 
the defendants' magazine had its largest circulation there."64 The 
Dillon court cited to Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc. for additional 
support of its view that forum circulation of defamatory material "is a 
key factor in determining whether a nonresident defendant has 
sufficient contacts with the forum. "65 Then, ignoring the clear 
statement in Calder that a plaintiffs contacts "may be so manifold as 
to permit jurisdiction when it would not exist in their absence,"66 the 
Dillon court, again relying on Keeton, wrote, "the plaintiffs contacts 
with the forum is a relatively minor factor in the analysis."67 
The United States Supreme Court's opinion in Calder gave no 
warrant for inserting consideration of the circulation of defamatory 
60. Met Life, 912  F.2d at 1065. 
6 1 .  Id. 
62. 976 F.2d 596, 598 (9th Cir. 1992). 
63. Id. at 599. 
64. Id. (citing Calder, 465 U.S. at 789-90). 
65. Dillon, 976 F.2d at 600 (citing Keeton v. Hustler Mag., 465 U.S. 770, 781 
( 1984)). 
66. Calder, 465 U. S. at 788. 
67. Dillon, 976 F.2d at 600 (citing Keeton, 465 U.S. at 775). 
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material within the forum as a key factor in the "effects" test analysis. 
It was the direction of wrongful conduct toward a plaintiff and the 
effects of that conduct where the plaintiff resided that supported the 
assertion of personal jurisdiction over intentional tortfeasors in the state 
of plaintiffs residence.68 In Calder, after stating that "the plaintiff is 
the focus of the activities of the defendants out of which the suit 
arises," the Court asserted that the defamation "impugned the 
professionalism of an entertainer whose television career was centered 
in California," and that "the brunt of the harm, in terms both of 
respondent's emotional distress and the injury to her professional 
reputation, was suffered in California," the Court concluded, 
"Li]urisdiction over petitioners is therefore proper in California based 
on the 'effects' of their Florida conduct in California."69 Nothing in 
this conclusion mentions or ascribes any significance to the circulation 
of defendants' article within the forum. Furthermore, the Court did not 
state that the defendants were aware that the brunt of their injury to the 
plaintiff would be felt in California "because the defendants' magazine 
had its largest circulation there," as the Dillon court suggested; 70 
rather, the court wrote, "they knew that the brunt of that injury would 
be felt by respondent in the State in which she lives and works and in 
which the National Enquirer has its largest circulation."71  This was 
the only mention of the circulation of the defamatory material within 
the forum in the Dillon Court's statement of its reasoning for the 
holding. 72 Circulation was also mentioned by the Court when it cited to 
defendants' claim that they were not responsible for the circulation of 
the article in California. It is to this argument that the Calder Court 
responded that it was not the circulation of the article within the forum, 
but rather the direction of intentional harms toward a forum resident 
that mattered. 73 Circulation in the forum state found no mention when 
the Calder Court went on to reiterate its ultimate conclusion in the 
68. See Calder, 465 U.S. at 789-90 (considering the harm felt by the plaintiff in the 
forum state arising from tortious activity aimed at the plaintiff to support jurisdiction in 
the forum state). 
69. Id. at 788-89. 
70. Dillon, 976 F.2d at 599 (citing Calder, 465 U.S. at 789-90). 
7 1. Calder, 465 U.S. at 789-90 (emphasis added). 
72. See id. ( focusing on the harm aimed at the resident of the forum state rather than 
defendant's connection with the forum state via the circulation of defendant's 
magazine). 
73. See id. at 789-90. 
2004 TERMINATING CALDER 209 
case: "In this case, petitioners are primacy participants in an alleged 
wrongdoing intentionally directed at a California resident, and 
jurisdiction over them is proper on that basis."74 Thus, the Dillon 
Court's creation of in-forum circulation as a key factor drifted beyond 
the requirements enunciated in Calder. Shadows of this development, 
as will later be seen, can be discerned in the Ninth Circuit's denial of 
jurisdiction in Schwarzenegger.75 
Core-Vent Corp. v. Nobel Industries AB was the first illustration 
of the consequences of the court's continuing adherence to the tripartite 
test that separately evaluates purposeful availment and reasonableness 
when assessing the propriety of assertions of personal jurisdiction in an 
intentional tort context. 76 Although the court tentatively concluded 
that the purposeful availment prong had been narrowly satisfied by 
reference to the Calder "effects" test, 77 the court concluded that the 
exercise of jurisdiction would nonetheless be unreasonable.78 Because 
the Calder Court made no mention of a separate reasonableness 
analysis in establishing that harmful effects directed at forum residents 
suffice for the assertion of jurisdiction, the Core-Vent court's 
74. Id. at 790. 
75. 374 F.3d 797 (9th Cir. 2004). 
76. 11 F.3d 1 482 (9th Cir. 1 993). 
77. Id. at 1487; see also id. at 1 493 (Wallace, C.J., dissenting) "[F]or purposes of 
this case, a majority of the panel agree that purposeful availment has been established. " 
Id. The Core- Vent court's application of Calder was clouded somewhat by the Dillon 
court's focus on the circulation of defamation within the forum state. Id. Writing that 
"it has not been alleged that California was a primary audience for the medical journals 
or that the defendants knew that the journals would be circulated in that state," the 
Core-Vent panel distinguished the case from Calder and suggested that this fact made 
it a "close question " whether "the acts in question here were 'expressly directed' at 
California." Id. at 1 486. The Core-Vent opinion also directly questioned whether 
California was the location where the brunt of harm was suffered, a question 
suggesting that the location of the "brunt " of the harm is the relevant determiner of 
where jurisdiction is permissible. Id. at 1 487. As then-Chief Judge Wallace aptly 
pointed out in his dissent, "In Calder, the fact that the author and editor knew the brunt 
of the harm from their article would be suffered in California was a factor that weighed 
in favor of purposeful direction, but it was not a prerequisite. To the contrary, the 
Court held that jurisdiction was proper because 'petitioners [were] primary participants 
in an alleged wrongdoing intentionally directed at a California resident."' Id. at 1492. 
Chief Judge Wallace added that "[the majority's] argument ignores one very important 
fact: the Supreme Court has already rejected the proposition that the brunt of the harm 
must be suffered in the forum. " Id. (citing Keeton v. Hustler Mag. , 465 U.S. 770 
(1984)). 
78. Core-Vent, 1 1  F.3d at 1483. 
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declaration that Calder's "effects" test was satisfied, but jurisdiction 
was nevertheless still unreasonable because it was inconsistent with 
Calder's holding. 
Next, in Gordy v. Daily News, L.P. , a case involving the 
publication of an allegedly defamatory article about Motown founder 
Berry Gordy in a New York newspaper, 79 the court attempted to 
minimize the impact of Dillon and Core-Vent by distinguishing those 
cases as involving harms against corporate plaintiffs incorporated in 
the forum but "doing business either elsewhere or everywhere."80 
Where an individual plaintiff is involved, the Gordy court indicated 
that "[t]he prime targeting arises, of course, from the fact that Gordy is 
an individual who lives in California . . . .  "81 The court concluded, "[i]t 
is reasonable to expect the bulk of the harm from defamation of an 
individual to be felt at his domicile."82 Because Gordy was a 
California resident, the court held that Calder supported a finding that 
the authors' contacts with California were sufficient. 83 Moving to a 
consideration of the reasonableness prong, the Gordy court decided that 
a slavish review of the oft-repeated seven reasonableness factors was 
not truly necessary.84 Instead, the court chose to articulate its own 
reasons for why it felt that the assertion of jurisdiction in this case 
would be reasonable. The court cited the following factors: 
[The defendants] knew that Gordy lived in California when they 
allegedly defamed him; they had good reason to expect that a 
substantial impact of their actions would be felt in California; they 
are in a business in which they deal with California matters 
regularly; the Daily News sends reporters to California; and the 
Dail�5 
News serves subscribers in California, though they are 
few. 
Although this separate consideration of reasonableness remains 
without any foundation in the approach suggested by Calder, the 
Gordy court's analysis did include many of the very factors that made 
79. 95 F.3d 829, 831 (9th Cir. 1996). 
80. Id. at 833. 
81. Id. 
82. Id. The court indicated that targeting also occurred through the newspaper's  
distribution of 13 to 18 copies of its publication in California. Id. 
83. Id. 
84. Id. at 836. 
85. Id. 
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the circumstances identified in Calder a reasonable basis for the 
assertion of jurisdiction over out-of-state perpetrators of intentional 
torts. 
Separate consideration of purposeful availment and 
reasonableness remained the hallmark of the Ninth Circuit's approach 
to evaluating specific jurisdiction in an intentional torts context in 
subsequent cases. Although this approach was used in Columbia 
Pictures Television v. Krypton Broadcasting of Birmingham, Inc., 
within the context of its purposeful availment analysis, the Ninth 
Circuit returned to the unadulterated version of the Calder rule that it 
had briefly flirted with in some of its earlier cases. 86 Because this case 
involved copyright infringement, the court had no difficulty finding 
purposeful availment based on the Calder "effects" test; the court 
wrote, "Columbia alleged, and the district court found, that [defendant] 
willfully infringed copyrights owned by Columbia, which, as 
[defendant] knew, had its principal place of business in the Central 
District [of California]. This fact alone is sufficient to satisfy the 
'purposeful availment' requirement."87 The court reaffirmed its 
commitment to a straightforward application of Calder (again within 
the purposeful availment analysis) in MCA Records Inc. v. Charly 
Records, Ltd. 88 Stating the Calder rule as "[ o ]ne who intentionally 
directs a tort at a forum's resident is ordinarily subject to jurisdiction in 
the forum state," the court found that the allegations of trademark 
infringement against a California corporation were sufficient to support 
a finding of purposeful availment under Calder. 89 The court restated 
its holding later in the opinion as follows: "Because Holdings and 
International have committed an intentional tort knowing that the 
effects would be borne by a California resident, the purposeful 
availment requirement is satisfied."90 
Unfortunately, one year later the court seized on a formulation of 
the Calder rule presented in Core- Vent to require that the brunt of the 
86. I 06 F .3d 284, 289 (9th Cir. 1997). 
87. Id. 
88. 108 F.3d 338 (table), 1997 WL 76173 at *8 (9th Cir. 1997). 
89. Id. "So long as Holdings and International were aware of MCA's rights in the 
Chess Masters and trademarks, knew that MCA was a California corporation, and 
knew that their licensing of the Masters and trademarks would result in infringing 
products being distributed in the United States, a finding of purposeful availment is 
appropriate under Calder. " Id. 
90. Id. at *9. 
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harm resulting from a defendant's conduct be suffered in the forum 
before jurisdiction can be deemed appropriate. As stated by the court 
in Panavision International, L.P. v. Toeppen, "[u]nder Calder, personal 
jurisdiction can be based upon: '( I )  Intentional actions (2) expressly 
aimed at the forum state (3) causing harm, the brunt of which is 
suffered-and which the defendant knows is likely to be suffered-in 
the forum state.' "91 The problem with this formulation of Calder is 
that the Court never stated that a prerequisite to jurisdiction was a 
finding that the forum was the location of the "brunt" of suffering and a 
determination that defendant had an awareness of this fact.92 Indeed, 
as then-Chief Judge Wallace pointed out in his Core-Vent dissent, the 
Supreme Court expressly rejected the proposition that the brunt of the 
harm must be suffered in the forum when it decided Keeton.93 
Notwithstanding the insertion of a "brunt of the harm" requirement into 
the Calder analysis, the court in Panavision properly focused on 
whether there was purposeful direction of harm toward a California 
resident in California: 
[h]is conduct, as he knew it likely would, had the effect of injuring 
Panavision in California where Panavision has its principal place 
of business and where the movie and television industry is 
centered. Under the 'effects test, ' the purposeful availment 
requirement necessary for specific, personal jurisdiction is 
satisfied. 94 
In most of the subsequent cases involving intentional torts the 
Ninth Circuit continued to adhere to the three-part formulation of the 
Calder effects test from Core- Vent. 95 However, the test was slightly 
91. 141 F.3d 1316, 1321 (9th Cir. 1998) (quoting Core-Vent Corp. v. Nobel 
Industries AB, 11 F.3d 1482, 1486 (9th Cir. 1993)). 
92. See Core-Vent Corp. v. Nobel Industries AB, 11 F.3d at 1492 (Wallace, C.J., 
dissenting) "In Calder, the fact that the author and editor knew the brunt of the harm 
from their article would be suffered in California was a factor that weighed in favor of 
purposeful direction, but it was not a prerequisite." Id. 
93. Id. 
94. 141 F.3d at 1322. 
95. See e.g. Harris Rutsky & Co. Ins. Services Inc. v. Bell & Clements Ltd., 328 
F.3d 1122, 1131 (9th Cir. 2003); Northwest Healthcare Alliance, Inc. v. 
Healthgrades.com, Inc., 50 Fed.Appx. 339, 341 (9th Cir. 2002) (unpublished); Rio 
Properties, Inc. v. Rio Intl. Interlink, 284 F .3d 1007, 1019-20 (9th Cir. 2002); Rippey v. 
Smith, 16 Fed.Appx. 596, 598 (9th Cir. 2001) (unpublished); Myers v. Bennett L. 
Offices, 238 F.3d 1068, 1072 (9th Cir. 2001); Bancroft & Masters, Inc. v. Augusta 
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altered in a series of more recent cases. First, in Bancroft & Masters, 
Inc. v. Augusta National Inc., the court indicated that the heart of the 
three-part Calder test was whether there was "express aiming" of 
conduct at a forum state, seemingly de-emphasizing the "brunt of the 
harm" requirement in the test.96 Then, the court in Myers v. Bennett 
Law Offices clarified that the test required a focus on whether the 
defendant "knew that its allegedly wrongful acts were aimed at [forum] 
residents" and rested its analysis on that question.97 Dole Food Co. v. 
Watts,98 marked what should have been the final nail in the coffin for 
the "brunt of the harm" requirement in the Ninth Circuit's three-part 
formulation of the Calder test. In that case, the court restated its test as 
follows: "The 'effects' test requires that the defendant allegedly have 
( 1 )  committed an intentional act, (2) expressly aimed at the forum state, 
(3) causing harm that the defendant knows is likely to be suffered in 
the forum state. "99 
This elimination of the "brunt of the harm" requirement in Dole 
Food was a welcome development and moved the court closer to the 
standard articulated in Calder. Explaining the court's elimination of 
the "brunt of the harm" requirement, Judge Fletcher, writing for a 
unanimous panel, indicated that this component of the test was the 
view of "one judge" and concluded, "Because the third judge joined the 
dissenter on the issue of purposeful availment, we believe that the 
dissenter's reading is controlling in Core-Vent as to the proportion of 
harm in the forum necessary to establish personal jurisdiction under the 
'effects' test."100 The court further tidied up the Ninth Circuit's three­
part test when it elaborated on the "express aiming" prong of the test, 
writing, "[t]hat requirement is satisfied when ' the defendant is alleged 
to have engaged in wrongful conduct targeted at a plaintiff whom the 
National Inc., 223 F.3d 1082, 1087 (9th Cir. 2000); Maggos v. Helm, 185 F.3d 868 
(table), 1999 WL 402448 at * l  (9th Cir. 1999); Staton v. Husky Computers, Inc., 176 
F.3d 484 (table), 1998 WL 808019 at *4 (9th Cir. 1998). Exceptions where the Ninth 
Circuit did not apply the Panavision test include Sebastian Intl., Inc. v. Russo/i/lo, 44 
Fed. Appx. 173, 175 (9th Cir. 2002) (unpublished) and Sierra Pacific Airlines v. Dallas 
Aerospace, 6 Fed. Appx. 606,608 (9th Cir. 2001) (unpublished). 
96. 223 F.3d at 1087. 
97. 238 F.3d at 1072. 
98. Dole Food Co. v. Watts, 303 F.3d 1104 (9th Cir. 2002). 
99. Id. at 1111. 
100. Id. at 1112-13. 
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defendant knows to be a resident of the forum state. ' " 101 In what was 
clearly a return to much of the simplicity of Calder, this statement 
encapsulated the essence of what the Supreme Court had held was 
sufficient to support jurisdiction in intentional tort cases. 
Unfortunately, despite the analysis of the court in Dole Food with 
regard to the "brunt of the harm" requirement, the Ninth Circuit 
nevertheless continued to articulate and apply the Core-Vent version of 
the Calder test in subsequent cases leading up to Schwarzenegger. 102 
IV. SCHWARZENEGGER V. FRED MARTIN MOTOR Co. 
In 2002, Fred Martin Motor Company ("Fred Martin"), an Ohio 
automobile dealership incorporated under the laws of Ohio, placed a 
full-page color advertisement (the "Advertisement") in the Akron 
Beacon Journal, a local Akron, Ohio-based newspaper.103 In addition 
to several photographs of automobiles available for purchase from the 
dealership, the Advertisement included a promise, in large lettering, 
stating that Fred Martin " 'WON'T BE BEAT.' " 104 Underneath this 
statement was a small picture of movie star and current California 
Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger ("Schwarzenegger") depicted in his 
role as "The Terminator."105 A "  'bubble quotation' " appeared next to 
Schwarzenegger's mouth in the picture, reading, " 'Arnold says: 
'Terminate EARLY at Fred Martin! ' "106 This statement refers to a 
special offer from Fred Martin to customers, inviting them to close out 
their current leases before the expected termination date, and to buy or 
lease a new car from Fred Martin. 107 Fred Martin never sought 
permission from Schwarzenegger to use his photograph in the 
Advertisement and no such permission was ever granted. 108 
101. Id. at 1111 (quoting Bancroft & Masters, 223 F.3d at 1087). 
102. See e.g. Harris Rutsky & Co. Ins. Services Inc. v. Bell & Clements Ltd., 328 
F.3d 1122, 1131 (9th Cir. 2003); Northwest Healthcare Alliance, Inc. v. 
Healthgrades.com, Inc., 50 Fed. Appx. 339, 340-41 (9th Cir. 2002) (unpublished). 
103. Schwarzenegger v. Fred Martin Motor Co., 374 F.3d 797, 799 (9th Cir. 2004). 
The record revealed no circulation of the newspaper beyond Ohio. ld. at 799-800. 
104. Id. at 799. 
1 05. Id. The Terminator is a 1 984 film in which Schwarzenegger played the title 
character, a time-traveling cyborg; The Terminator remains one of Schwarzenegger's 
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Schwarzenegger alleged in his complaint that if he received a request 
for permission to use his picture, it would have been refused. 109 Such 
a refusal would have stemmed from Schwarzenegger's policy of 
refusing all product endorsements in order to prevent an " 'over­
saturation of his image.' "110 Avoiding over-saturation is critical, 
according to Schwarzenegger, in order to maximize the interest of the 
movie-going public in spending money to see his films. 111 The 
Advertisement ran five times. 1 1 2 
Schwarzenegger brought suit in California state court alleging 
that the unauthorized uses of his image infringed his right of 
publicity.113 In California, celebrities enjoy both a statutory and 
common law right of publicity that protects against the use of one's 
name, photowaph, or likeness for commercial purposes without his or 
her consent. 4 Fred Martin removed the action to federal district court 
in California and subsequently moved to dismiss the complaint for lack 
of personal jurisdiction. 115 The district court granted the motion and 
Schwarzenegger appealed.116 
A unanimous panel of the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district 
court's dismissal of Schwarzenegger's complaint for lack of personal 
jurisdiction.117 Writing for the court, Judge Fletcher identified the 
Calder "effects" test as the appropriate vehicle for determining the 
propriety of jurisdiction in this case, 1 18 but ultimately concluded that 
its requisites were not met because the court found there was no 
express aiming of activity toward California on the part of the 
defendant.119 The panel reached this conclusion by applying the three­
part version of the Calder test that the Ninth Circuit articulated in Dole 
Food, which requires the defendant to have " '( 1)  committed an 
intentional act, (2) expressly aimed at the forum state, (3) causing harm 
109. Id. 
110. Id. at 800. 
111. Id. 
112. Id. at 799. 
113. Id. at 799. 
114. Cal. Civ. Code Ann. § 3344; Comedy Ill Productions, 21 P.3d 797, 799 (Cal. 
200 1). 
115. Schwarzenegger, 374 F.3d at 800. 
116. Id. at 800. 
117. Id. at 807. 
118. Id. at 803. 
119. Id. at 807. Judges Kleinfeld and Wardlaw joined in the opinion. 
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that the defendant knows is likely to be suffered in the forum 
state. ' "120 After finding that Fred Martin committed an intentional act 
by placing the Advertisement, 121 the court found that the intentional 
act was not aimed at California. 122 Writing that "the purpose of the 
Advertisement was to entice Ohioans to buy or lease cars from Fred 
Martin, . . .  [t]he Advertisement was never circulated in California, and 
Fred Martin had no reason to believe that any Californians would see 
it."123 Moreover, since "Fred Martin certainly had no reason to believe 
that a Californian had a current car lease with Fred Martin that could be 
' terminated, '  " the Schwarzenegger court concluded that "Fred 
Martin's express aim was local" and that "the Advertisement was not 
expressly aimed at California."124 Having found that Schwarzenegger 
failed to establish the requisite express aiming on the part of Fred 
Martin, the court dispensed with any consideration of the third prong of 
the Calder test. 125 
Although it was the "express aiming" prong of the test that the 
Schwarzenegger court found to be unsatisfied, it was ultimately the 
court's improper identification of the relevant intentional act that 
resulted in its erroneous conclusion that there was no express aiming 
such as would render Fred Martin amenable to jurisdiction in 
California.126 The intentional acts of concern under Calder are the 
"allegedly [tortious] actions" of the defendant that give rise to the 
claim being prosecuted by the plaintiff. 127 That is, in Calder it was not 
the defendants' act of publishing an article ( an act targeted at the entire 
universe of the Enquirer's readership) but rather the act of libeling the 
plaintiff (an act aimed at its California victim) that gave rise to the 
claim and was the basis of jurisdiction. 128 In California, the tortious 
120. Id. at 805 (quoting Dole Food Co. v. Watts, 303 F.3d 1104, 1111 (9th Cir. 
2002)). 




125. Id. at 807 n. 1. 
126. Id. at 807. 
127. Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783, 789 (1984) (finding jurisdiction appropriate 
where "the plaintiff is the focus of the activities of the defendants out of which the suit 
arises"); Id. at 788. "[T]heir intentional, and allegedly tortious, actions were expressly 
aimed at California." Id. at 789. 
128. Id. 
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act giving rise to a claim of invasion of one's right of publicity is the 
act of knowingly using "another's name, voice, signature, photogra�h9 or likeness, in any manner . . .  without such person's prior consent." 2 
Thus, in Schwarzenegger, the act that gave rise to the plaintiffs claim 
was not the placement of the Advertisement, but rather the act of 
knowingly using Schwarzenegger's image and likeness. 130 The court 
explicitly acknowledged this when it wrote, "the conduct of which 
Schwarzenegger complains-the unauthorized inclusion of the 
photograph in the Advertisement and its distribution in the Akron 
Beacon Journal-took place in Ohio, not California."131 The error of 
the Schwarzenegger court then was its contradictory determination 
later in the opinion that the Advertisement-not the previously 
identified unauthorized use of Schwarzenegger's image-was the 
intentional act relevant to its analysis. 132 
Had the court properly identified the unauthorized use of 
Schwarzenegger's image as the relevant intentional act under the first 
prong of its version of the Calder test, the court would have had no 
difficulty concluding that the second prong, express aiming, was 
satisfied.133 The intentional act of using Schwarzenegger's image was 
clearly targeted at Schwarzenegger because it was his image that was 
being used. Just as in Calder, where the plaintiffs status as the victim 
of the defendant's libel meant that she was the focus or aim of the 
defendants' actions, and in Sinatra, where Mr. Sinatra's  status as the 
subject of the false utterance itself made him the target of the 
defendants' actions, 134 so too was Schwarzenegger the target of Fred 
Martin's actions as the victim of its tortious conduct. 135 Because Fred 
Martin's tortious conduct impaired the image, reputation, and 
pecuniary interest of "an entertainer whose [movie] career was 
centered in California" and constituted "wrongdoing intentionally 
129. Cal. Civ. Code Ann. § 3344 (West 1997). 
130. Schwarzenegger, 374 F.3d at 806 (holding that the intentional act was 
committed when Fred Martin placed the Advertisement). 
131. Id. at 803 (emphases added). 
132. Id. at 806. 
133. See generally Calder, 465 U.S. at 788-90. 
134. See generally Sinatra v. Natl. Enquirer, Inc., 854 F .2d 1191, 1193-98 (9th Cir. 
1949). 
135. Schwarzenegger, 374 F.3d at 799-80. 
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directed at a California resident," 136 jurisdiction over Fred Martin 
should have been "proper on that basis." 
V. THE NINTH CIRCUIT' S  ADULTERATION OF THE CALDER "EFFECTS" 
TEST 
Even though the Schwarzenegger court's erroneous outcome was 
directly a result of its improper identification of the relevant intentional 
act, more broadly the decision reflects the problems attendant with the 
Ninth Circuit's interpretation of the meaning of Calder itself. The 
Ninth Circuit's version of the Calder "effects" test has two distinctive 
attributes that have caused the court to stray from Calder's original 
vision. 
First, the Ninth Circuit's test is trifurcated into separate prongs: 
An intentional act requirement, an express aiming requirement, and a 
forum harm requirement. Although separating the Court's "effects" 
test into separate analytical units is not problematic per se, the 
articulation of a separate intentional act requirement for a test that was 
meant to be applied primarily to cases involving intentional torts seems 
superfluous. The Ninth Circuit has stated that the test is applicable to 
intentional tort cases 1 37 and to cases involving alleged statutory 
violations that can be likened to tort cases. 138 When applying the 
intentional act requirement of the test, the court has found the mere 
allegation of an intentional tort to satisfy that aspect of the test. 1 39 
Calder too points to the "allegedly [tortious] actions" and "alleged 
wrongdoing" of the defendants as the relevant actions to evaluate, 
rejecting any suggested focus on the circulation or distribution of 
1 36. Calder, 465 U.S. at 788, 790. 
137. See e.g. Dole Food Co. v. Watts, 303 F.3d 1 104, 111 1  (9th Cir. 2002). "Under 
our precedents, the purposeful direction or availment requirement for specific 
jurisdiction is analyzed in intentional tort cases under the 'effects' test derived from 
Calder v. Jones." Id. 
138. See e.g. Panavision Intl., LP v. Toeppen, 14 1 F.3d 13 1 6, 1 321 (9th Cir. 1998) 
(affirming that alleged trademark infringement is "akin to a tort case " and thus 
warranted application of the Calder "effects " test). 
1 39. See e.g. Harris Rutsky & Co. Ins. Services, Inc. v. Bell & Clements Ltd., 328 
F.3d 1122, 1 1 3 1  (9th Cir. 2003) (finding the intentional act requirement to be satisfied 
after simply stating, "B & C is alleged to have committed an intentional tort . . .  "); 
Dole Food Co., 303 F.3d at 11 11. "Because it is clear that Dole has sufficiently 
alleged that Watts and Boenneken acted intentionally, we skip to the 'express aiming' 
requirement. " Id. 
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defendants' article in California in that case.140 Given that the 
presence of an allegation of intentionally tortious or unlawful conduct 
is a prerequisite to the applicability of the Calder "effects" test 
generally, it is a waste of time and effort for courts in the Ninth Circuit 
to engage in an analysis of the intentional act requirement where an 
intentional tort is alleged. 
More importantly, the existence of a separate intentional act 
prong permits the court to be distracted into considering actions beyond 
the acts constituting the tortious conduct when searching for the 
requisite intentional act under the Ninth Circuit's version of the Calder 
test. This is precisely what occurred in Schwarzenegger. Rather than 
simply stating that Schwarzenegger's allegation of an intentional tort 
sufficed, the court engaged in a tortured and confusing analysis of the 
meaning of the word "act" under the Restatement.141 Such an abstract 
and ungrounded analysis was not only completely unnecessary because 
it was obvious that Fred Martin was at least alleged to have 
intentionally committed some act as the basis for Schwarzenegger's 
complaint, 142 but it missed the heart of what the Calder Court 
identified as the conduct on which "effects" based jurisdiction is 
founded: "Allegedly tortious actions."143 
The second troubling aspect of the Ninth Circuit's iteration of 
Calder is that the Ninth Circuit's test is simply a means of satisfying 
the purposeful availment prong of that court's three-pronged specific 
jurisdiction test.144 Calder did not indicate that its test was so limited. 
Rather, in what appeared to be a return to the unitary personal 
jurisdiction analysis originally contemplated in International Shoe, 145 
140. Calder, 465 U.S. at 789-90. 
141. Schwarzenegger, 374 F.3d at 806. 
142. See id. at 799 (indicating that Schwarzenegger brought suit complaining of 
"unauthorized uses of his image"); see also id. at 803 (identifying "the conduct of 
which Schwarzenegger complains [as] the unauthorized inclusion of the photograph in 
the Advertisement" and its publication). 
143. Calder, 465 U.S. at 789. 
144. The Three Prongs are: " (1) The nonresident defendant must do some act or 
consummate some transaction with the forum or perform some act by which he 
purposefully avails himself of the privilege of conducting activities in the forum, 
thereby invoking the benefits and protections of its laws. (2) The claim must be one 
which arises out of or results from the defendant's forum-related activities. (3) 
Exercise of jurisdiction must be reasonable." Data Disc, Inc. v. Systems Technology 
Associates, Inc., 557 F.2d 1280, 1287 (9th Cir. 1977). 
145. See Douglas D. McFarland, Drop the Shoe: A Law of Personal Jurisdiction, 68 
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the Calder Court engaged in a unified evaluation of the defendants 
contacts to determine if jurisdiction would comport with "fair play and 
substantial justice" without separately considering purposeful 
availment and reasonableness. 146 By simply stating that jurisdiction 
was "therefore proper in California based on the 'effects' of their 
Florida conduct in California," 147 and that "petitioners are primary 
participants in an alleged wrongdoing intentionally directed at a 
California resident, and jurisdiction over them is proper on that 
basis," 148 the Court thereby determined that jurisdiction on the basis of 
such contacts was reasonable. Thus, in the wake of Calder the only 
inquiry needed was whether the factual circumstances present in 
Calder were present in the case at bar. Such an approach to applying 
Calder was reflected in several of the Ninth Circuit's early decisions in 
this area. 149 
By limiting the relevance of the Calder "effects" test to 
satisfaction of the purposeful availment prong, the Ninth Circuit has 
robbed the Court's test of its intended scope and simplicity. The 
Calder Court, by permitting jurisdiction over all instances involving 
intentional tortfeasors in the state in which their victims are injured and 
reside, created a broad grant of jurisdiction that empowers states to 
adjudicate all cases where their citizens are intentionally targeted by 
foreign wrongdoers. As the Court explained, such a scope for state 
court jurisdiction comports with fair play and substantial justice 
Mo. L. Rev. 753, 763-64 (2003). "Although in recent years the Court has claimed the 
test to be two-part, or even multi-part, the original, unpolished International Shoe test 
is clearly a one-step, unitary test. A court is not required to find 'minimum contacts' 
and 'fair play and substantial justice. '  Neither is a court required to find 'minimum 
contacts' or 'fair play and substantial justice.' The opinion requires a court find 
'minimum contacts with (the state) such that the maintenance of the suit does not 
offend "traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice." ' The connective words 
'such that' meld the test into a single, unitary whole." Id. 
146. Calder, 465 U.S. at 788-90. 
147. Id. at 789. 
148. Id. at 790. 
149. See e.g., Michel v. Am. Capital Enterprises, 884 F.2d 582 (table), 1 989 WL 
1 02039 at *3 (9th Cir. 1989). "The Supreme Court has held that where a defendant 
commits an intentionally tortious act knowing it will have a potentially devastating 
effect on the plaintiff in the forum state, a court may exercise personal jurisdiction over 
the defendant and not run afoul of the due process clause." Id. ; Paccar Intl., Inc. v. 
Commercial Bank of Kuwait, S.A.K., 757 F.2d 1058, 1 064 (9th Cir. 1985). "A tortious 
act, standing alone, can satisfy all three requirements under Data Disc if the act is 
aimed at a resident of the state or has effects in the state." Id. 
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because, "An individual injured in California need not go to Florida to 
seek redress from persons who, though remaining in Florida, 
knowingly cause the injury in Califomia."150 The Ninth Circuit's 
version of the Calder test rolls back this jurisdictional grant because it 
permits courts to declare personal jurisdiction to be unreasonable even 
if the Calder "effects" test is satisfied.151 Because the Calder Court 
has deemed jurisdiction to be appropriate under the circumstances it 
identified, denying jurisdiction where the Calder "effects" test is 
satisfied purportedly because jurisdiction would nonetheless be 
unreasonable can be described as nothing more than oxymoronic. 
Beyond creating a broad jurisdictional grant, the Calder Court 
also simplified the process for evaluating personal jurisdiction in the 
intentional torts context, a simplification that the Ninth Circuit has 
managed to destroy. The issue of personal jurisdiction has grown to 
become one of the most frequently and heavily litigated issues in the 
federal court system, 152 demonstrating that the predictability the Court 
indicated was its goal to bring about 153 has simply not materialized. 
Enter Calder, where the Court seized the opportunity to infuse 
predictability into litigation involving intentional torts by holding that 
where a defendant is alleged to have participated in wrongdoing 
directed at a forum resident, jurisdiction in that forum will be 
proper. 154 Rather than taking the Calder Court's opinion at face value 
and enjoying the benefits to the court system that would result from 
reduced litigation over this issue in intentional tort cases and from a 
simplified analysis for judges where such questions arise, the Ninth 
Circuit has embraced an interpretation of Calder that complicates the 
jurisdictional analysis in this area by requiring a reasonableness 
evaluation separate from the Calder analysis. Because the 
reasonableness analysis is hopelessly subjective and unpredictable, 
defendants are encouraged to throw the dice and challenge personal 
150. Calder, 465 U.S. at 790. 
151. See e.g. , Core-Vent Corp. v. Nobel Industries AB, 11 F.3d 1482 (9th Cir. 1993) 
(finding the Calder test to be satisfied but denying jurisdiction based on a failure to 
satisfy the reasonableness prong of the specific jurisdiction test). 
152. McFarland, supra n. 145, at 777 n. 113. 
153. See Worldwide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297 (1980) 
(articulating its goal of providing defendants with more predictability in the area of 
personal jurisdiction so that they could order their conduct accordingly). 
154. Calder, 465 U.S. at 790. 
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jurisdiction 155--even where Calder can be satisfied-in case they can 
convince the judge that jurisdiction for whatever reason should not be 
asserted. In sum, by continuing to consider reasonableness separately 
after conducting a Calder analysis, the Ninth Circuit has undermined 
the impact of Calder and deprived plaintiffs-and courts-of the 
benefits of Calder's clear rule. 
VI. CONCLUSION: TIME FOR A CHANGE 
Because the Ninth Circuit's current interpretation of the Calder 
"effects" test frustrates the indented effects of the Calder holding (no 
pun intended), and because it permits wrong decisions, such as 
Schwarzenegger, to occur, the Ninth Circuit should adopt a new 
standard for evaluating effects-based assertions of personal jurisdiction. 
More precisely, the court should return to the interpretation of the 
Calder "effects" test it articulated in some of its earlier cases. The 
following test is proposed: Where intentional wrongdoing serves as the 
basis for a cause of action, jurisdiction is proper if the wrongful act is 
aimed at a resident of the state and has effects in the state. Under this 
rule, intentional wrongdoing is aimed at its victim, meaning that 
victims harmed by intentional acts can sue in their state of residence. 
Whether effects occur in the state will remain evaluated under the 
court's existing precedents. This new approach requires the Ninth 
Circuit to abandon its adherence to a tripartite test for specific 
jurisdiction where intentional wrongdoing is alleged. Under the new 
test, if intentional wrongful conduct is the basis for the claim, the 
tripartite test is circumvented for a determination of the victim's 
domicile and the situs of harm. 
The benefits of such an approach will be several: Reduced 
litigation over personal jurisdiction in the intentional torts context; 
increased predictability for defendants regarding where their conduct 
will subject them to jurisdiction; a concomitant improvement in 
defendants' ability to order their behavior in a way that will limit their 
amenability to jurisdiction; and the protection of unwitting victims 
from the burden of having to travel to the wrongdoers' home states to 
vindicate harms committed against them, an interest the Calder Court 
explicitly intended to promote. 156 
155.  McFarland, supra n. 144, at 795 n. 181. 
156. See Calder, 465 U.S. at 790. 
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Applying this test to Schwarzenegger would have resulted in the 
Ninth Circuit reversing the dismissal of Schwarzenegger's complaint 
for lack of personal jurisdiction. Having pied infringement of his right 
of publicity-which involves the knowing unauthorized use of 
Schwarzenegger's likeness-the questions would have been ( 1 )  
whether Schwarzenegger was a resident of California and (2) whether 
the harmful effects of the unauthorized usage occurred in California. 
Schwarzenegger was at the time, 157 and still is, a California resident, 
and the harm alleged to have been suffered-potentially reduced 
compensation arising from the diminution of "his reputation as a major 
motion wcture star," and the "overexposure of his image to the 
public" 1 8---occurred in California because that is where 
Schwarzenegger lives and works and is where his career and the movie 
industry are centered. 
The limitations on state court assertions of personal jurisdiction 
are to be taken seriously. However, courts should not translate these 
limitations into a general bias against all assertions of state court 
jurisdiction. Simply because the jurisdictional ramifications of the 
Calder rule may be broad, that does not mean courts should take it 
upon themselves to reinterpret the "effects" test in a way that limits its 
reach beyond all recognition. State courts have every right to 
adjudicate disputes arising from wrongdoing targeted into the forum at 
their residents, as the Supreme Court has affirmed. The Ninth 
Circuit-and other courts-should return to the standard originally 
envisioned and articulated by the Court in Calder. 
1 57. See Schwarzenegger v. Fred Martin Motor Co., 374 F.3d 797, 799 (9th Cir. 
2003). 
1 58. Id. at 800. 
